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Abstract—A security measure called effective security is de-
fined that includes strong secrecy and stealth communication.
Effective secrecy ensures that a message cannot be deciphered
and that the presence of meaningful communication is hidden.
To measure stealth we use resolvability and relate this to binary
hypothesis testing. Results are developed for wire-tap channels
and broadcast channels with confidential messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] derived the secrecy capacity for degraded wire-
tap channels (see Fig. 1). Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [2] extended the
results to broadcast channels with confidential messages. In
both [1] and [2], secrecy was measured by a normalized mutual
information between the message M and the eavesdropper’s
output Zn under a secrecy constraint
1
n
I(M ;Zn) ≤ S (1)
which is referred to as weak secrecy. Weak secrecy has the
advantage that one can trade off S for rate. The drawback is
that even S ≈ 0 is usually considered too weak because the
eavesdropper can decipher nS bits of M , which grows with
n. Therefore, [3] (see also [4]) advocated using strong secrecy
where secrecy is measured by the unnormalized mutual infor-
mation I(M ;Zn) and requires
I(M ;Zn) ≤ ξ (2)
for any ξ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
In related work, Han and Verdu´ [5] studied resolvability
based on variational distance that addresses the number of bits
needed to mimic a marginal distribution of a prescribed joint
distribution. Bloch and Laneman [6] used the resolvability
approach of [5] and extended the results in [2] to continuous
random variables and channels with memory.
The main contribution of this work is to define a new and
stronger security measure for wire-tap channels that includes
not only reliability and (wiretapper) confusion but also stealth.
The measure is satisfied by random codes and by using a re-
cently developed simplified proof [7] of resolvability based on
unnormalized informational divergence (see also [8, Lemma
11]). In particular, we measure secrecy by the informational
divergence
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) (3)
where PMZn is the joint distribution of MZn, PM is the
distribution of M , PZn is the distribution of Zn, and QnZ is
the distribution that the eavesdropper expects to observe when
the source is not communicating useful messages. We call this
security measure effective secrecy. One can easily check that
(see (7) below)
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) = I(M ;Z
n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Confusion
+D(PZn ||Q
n
Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Stealth
(4)
where we interpret I(M ;Zn) as a measure of “non-
confusion” and D(PZn ||QnZ) as a measure of “non-stealth”.
We justify the former interpretation by using error probability
in Sec. III and the latter by using binary hypothesis testing
in Sec. IV. Thus, by making D(PMZn ||PMQnZ)→ 0 we not
only keep the message secret from the eavesdropper but also
hide the presence of meaningful communication.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we state
the problem. In Section III we state and prove the main result.
Section IV relates the result to hypothesis testing. Section V
discusses related works.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Random variables are written with upper case letters and
their realizations with the corresponding lower case letters. Su-
perscripts denote finite-length sequences of variables/symbols,
e.g., Xn = X1, . . . , Xn. Subscripts denote the position of
a variable/symbol in a sequence. For instance, Xi denotes
the i-th variable in Xn. We use Xni to denote the sequence
Xi, . . . , Xn, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A random variable X has probability
distribution PX and the support of PX is denoted as supp(PX).
We write probabilities with subscripts PX(x) but we drop
the subscripts if the arguments of the distribution are lower
case versions of the random variables. For example, we write
P (x) = PX(x). If the Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to PX , then we
have P (xn) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) and we write PXn = PnX . We
often also use QnX to refer to sequences of i.i.d. random
variables. Calligraphic letters denote sets. The size of a set
S is denoted as |S| and the complement is denoted as Sc.
For X with alphabet X , we denote PX(S) =
∑
x∈S PX(x)
for any S ⊆ X . We use T nǫ (PX) to denote the set of letter-
typical sequences of length n with respect to the probability
distribution PX and the non-negative number ǫ [9, Ch. 3],
[10], i.e., we have
T nǫ (PX) =
{
xn :
∣∣∣N(a|xn)
n
− PX(a)
∣∣∣ ≤ ǫPX(a), ∀a ∈ X}
where N(a|xn) is the number of occurrences of a in xn.
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Fig. 1. A wire-tap channel.
B. Wire-Tap Channel
Consider the wire-tap channel depicted in Fig. 1. Joey has
a message M which is destined for Chandler but should be
kept secret from Ross. The message M is uniformly distributed
over {1, . . . , L}, L = 2nR, and an encoder f(·) maps M to
the sequence
Xn = f(M,W ) (5)
with help of a randomizer variable W that is independent of M
and uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , L1}, L1 = 2nR1 . The
purpose of W is to confuse Ross so that he learns little about
M . Xn is transmitted through a memoryless channel QnY Z|X .
Chandler observes the channel output Y n while Ross observes
Zn. The pair MZn has the joint distribution PMZn . Chandler
estimates Mˆ from Y n and the average error probability is
P (n)e = Pr
[
Mˆ 6= M
]
. (6)
Ross tries to learn M from Zn and secrecy is measured by
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z)
=
∑
(m,zn)
∈supp(P
MZn
)
P (m, zn) log
(
P (m, zn)
P (m) ·QnZ(z
n)
·
P (zn)
P (zn)
)
=
∑
(m,zn)
∈supp(P
MZn
)
P (m, zn)
(
log
P (zn|m)
P (zn)
+ log
P (zn)
QnZ(z
n)
)
= I(M ;Zn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Confusion
+D(PZn ||Q
n
Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Stealth
(7)
where PZn is the distribution Ross observes at his channel
output and QnZ is the distribution Ross expects to observe if
Joey is not sending useful information. For example, if Joey
transmits Xn with probability QnX(Xn) through the channel,
then we have
QnZ(z
n) =
∑
xn∈supp(Qn
X
)
QnX(x
n)QnZ|X(z
n|xn). (8)
When Joey sends useful messages, then PZn and QnZ are
different. But a small D(PMZn ||PMQnZ) implies that both
I(M ;Zn) and D(PZn ||QnZ) are small which in turn implies
that Ross learns little about M and cannot recognize whether
Joey is communicating anything meaningful. A rate R is
achievable if for any ξ1, ξ2 > 0 there is a sufficiently large n
and an encoder and a decoder such that
P (n)e ≤ ξ1 (9)
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) ≤ ξ2. (10)
The effective secrecy capacity CS is the supremum of the set
of achievable R. We wish to determine CS .
III. MAIN RESULT AND PROOF
We prove the following result.
Theorem 1: The effective secrecy capacity of the wire-tap
channel is the same as the weak and strong secrecy capacity,
namely
CS = max
QV X
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (11)
where the maximization is over all joint distributions QVX
satisfying the Markov chain
V −X − Y Z. (12)
One may restrict the cardinality of V to |V| ≤ |X | .
A. Achievability
We use random coding and the proof technique of [7].
Random Code: Fix a distribution QX and generate L · L1
codewords xn(m,w), m = 1, . . . , L, w = 1, . . . , L1 using∏n
i=1QX(xi(m,w)). This defines the codebook
C = {xn(m,w),m = 1, . . . , L, w = 1, . . . , L1} (13)
and we denote the random codebook by
C˜ = {Xn(m,w)}
(L,L1)
(m,w)=(1,1). (14)
Encoding: To send a message m, Joey chooses w uniformly
from {1, . . . , L1} and transmits xn(m,w). Hence, for a fixed
codebook C every xn(m,w) occurs with probability
PXn(x
n(m,w)) =
1
L · L1
(15)
rather than QnX(xn(m,w)). Further, for every pair (m, zn) we
have (see (8))
P (zn|m) =
L1∑
w=1
1
L1
·QnZ|X(z
n|xn(m,w)) (16)
P (zn) =
L∑
m=1
L1∑
w=1
1
L · L1
·QnZ|X(z
n|xn(m,w)). (17)
Chandler: Chandler puts out (mˆ, wˆ) if there is a unique pair
(mˆ, wˆ) satisfying the typicality check
(xn(mˆ, wˆ), yn) ∈ T nǫ (QXY ). (18)
Otherwise he puts out (mˆ, wˆ) = (1, 1).
Analysis: Define the events
E1 : {(Mˆ, Wˆ ) 6= (M,W )}
E2 : D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) > ξ2. (19)
Let E = E1 ∪ E2 so that we have
Pr[E] ≤ Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] (20)
where we have used the union bound. Pr[E1] can be made
small with large n as long as
R+R1 < I(X ;Y )− δǫ(n) (21)
3where δǫ(n) → 0 as n → ∞ (see [10]) which implies that
P
(n)
e is small.
Pr[E2] can be made small with large n as long as [7,
Theorem 1]
R1 > I(X ;Z) + δ
′
ǫ(n) (22)
where δ′ǫ(n) → 0 as n → ∞. This is because the average
divergence over M , W , C˜ and Zn satisfies (see [7, Equ. (9)])
E[D(PMZn ||PMQnZ)]
(a)
= E[D(PM ||PM ) +D(PZn|M ||QnZ |PM )]
(b)
= E
[
log
∑L1
j=1Q
n
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(M, j))
L1 ·QnZ(Z
n)
]
=
L∑
m=1
L1∑
w=1
1
L · L1
E
[
log
∑L1
j=1Q
n
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(m, j))
L1 ·QnZ(Z
n)
∣∣∣∣∣M = m,W = w
]
(c)
≤
L∑
m=1
L1∑
w=1
1
L · L1
E
[
log
(
Qn
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(m,w))
L1 ·QnZ(Z
n)
+ 1
)∣∣∣∣∣M = m,W = w
]
(d)
= E
[
log
(
Qn
Z|X(Z
n|Xn)
L1 ·QnZ(Z
n)
+ 1
)]
(23)
where
(a) follows from the chain rule for informational divergence;
(b) follows from (16) and by taking the expectation over
M,W,Xn(1, 1), . . . , Xn(L,L1), Z
n;
(c) follows by the concavity of the logarithm and Jensen’s in-
equality applied to the expectation over the Xn(m, j), j 6=
w for a fixed m;
(d) follows by choosing XnZn ∼ QnXZ .
Next we can show that the right hand side (RHS) of (23) is
small if (22) is valid by splitting the expectation in (23) into
sums of typical and atypical pairs (see [7, Equ. (11)-(16)]).
But if the RHS of (23) approaches 0, then using (7) we have
E [I(M ;Zn) +D(PZn ||QnZ)]→ 0. (24)
Combining (20), (21) and (22) we can make Pr[E] → 0 as
n→∞ as long as
R+R1 < I(X ;Y ) (25)
R1 > I(X ;Z). (26)
We hence have the achievability of any R satisfying
0 ≤ R < max
QX
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]. (27)
Of course, if the RHS of (27) is non-positive, then we require
R = 0. Now we prefix a channel Qn
X|V to the original channel
Qn
Y Z|X and obtain a new channel QnY Z|V where
QnY Z|V (y
n, zn|vn)
=
∑
xn∈supp(Qn
X|V
(·|vn))
QnX|V (x
n|vn)QnY Z|X(y
n, zn|xn).
(28)
Using a similar analysis as above, we have the achievability
of any R satisfying
0 ≤ R < max
QV X
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (29)
where the maximization is over all QVX satisfying (12).
Again, if the RHS of (29) is non-positive, then we require
R = 0. As usual, the purpose of adding the auxiliary variable
V is to potentially increase R. Note that V = X recovers
(27). Hence, the RHS of (27) is always smaller than or equal
to the RHS of (29).
Remark 1: The average divergence E[D(PMZn ||PMQnZ)]
can be viewed as the sum of I(M C˜;Zn) and D(PZn ||QnZ)
[11, Sec. III] (see also [7, Sec. III-B]). To see this, consider
E[D(PMZn ||PMQnZ)]
(a)
= E
[
log
∑L1
j=1Q
n
Z|X(Z
n|Xn(M, j))
L1 ·QnZ(Z
n)
]
=
L∑
m=1
1
L
∑
xn(1,1)
· · ·
∑
xn(L,L1)
(L,L1)∏
k=(1,1)
QnX(x
n(k))
∑
zn
L1∑
w=1
1
L1
QnZ|X(z
n|xn(m,w))
log
[∑L1
j=1
1
L1
QnZ|X(z
n|xn(m, j))
QnZ(z
n)
]
=
L∑
m=1
P (m)
∑
C
P (C|m)
∑
zn
P (zn|m, C) log
P (zn|m, C)
QnZ(z
n)
=
∑
(m,C,zn)
P (m, C, zn)
(
log
P (zn|m, C)
P (zn)
+ log
P (zn)
QnZ(z
n)
)
= I(M C˜;Zn) +D(PZn ||Q
n
Z) (30)
where (a) follows by (23)(b). Therefore, as
E[D(PMZn ||PMQnZ)] → 0 we have I(M C˜;Zn) → 0
which means that M C˜ and Zn are (almost) independent.
This makes sense, since for effective secrecy the adversary
learns little about M nor about the presence of meaningful
transmission.
B. Converse
The converse follows as in [2, Theorem 1]. We provide an
alternative proof using the telescoping identity [12, Sec. G].
Suppose that for some ξ1, ξ2 > 0 there exists a sufficiently
large n, an encoder and a decoder such that (9) and (10) are
4satisfied. We have
log2 L = nR
= H(M)
= I(M ;Y n) +H(M |Y n)
(a)
≤ I(M ;Y n) + (1 + ξ1 · nR)
(b)
≤ I(M ;Y n)− I(M ;Zn) + ξ2 + (1 + ξ1 · nR) (31)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality and (b) follows from
(7) and (10). Using the telescoping identity [12, Equ. (9) and
(11)] we have
1
n
[I(M ;Y n)− I(M ;Zn)]
=
n∑
i=1
[I(M ;Zni+1Y
i)− I(M ;Zni Y
i−1)]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(M ;Yi|Y
i−1Zni+1)− I(M ;Zi; |Y
i−1Zni+1)]
(a)
= I(M ;YT |Y
T−1ZnT+1T )− I(M ;ZT |Y
T−1ZnT+1T )
(b)
= I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
≤ max
QUV X
[I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)]
≤ max
u
max
QV X|U=u
[I(V ;Y |U = u)− I(V ;Z|U = u)] (32)
(c)
= max
QV X
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (33)
where
(a) follows by letting T be independent of all other random
variables and uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n};
(b) follows by defining
U = Y T−1ZnT+1T, V = MU,
X = XT , Y = YT , Z = ZT ; (34)
(c) follows because if the maximum in (32) is achieved for
U = u∗ and QVX|U=u∗ , then the same can be achieved
in (33) by choosing a QVX = QVX|U=u∗ .
Combining (31) and (33) we have
R ≤
max
QV X
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]
1− ξ1
+
ξ2 + 1
(1− ξ1)n
. (35)
Letting n→∞, ξ1 → 0, and ξ2 → 0, we have
R ≤ max
QV X
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (36)
where the maximization is over all QVX satisfying the Markov
chain (12). The cardinality bound in Theorem 1 was derived
in [13, Theorem 22.1]. This completes the converse.
C. Broadcast Channels with Confidential Messages
Broadcast channels with confidential messages (BCC) [2]
are wire-tap channels with common messages. For the BCC
(Fig. 2), Joey has a common message M0 destined for both
Chandler and Ross which is independent of M and uniformly
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Fig. 2. A broadcast channel with a confidential message.
distributed over {1, . . . , L0}, L0 = 2nR0 . An encoder maps
M0 and M to
Xn = f(M0,M,W ) (37)
which is sent through the channel Qn
Y Z|X . Chandler estimates
(Mˆ0, Mˆ) from Y n while Ross estimates M˜0 from Zn. The
average error probability is
P ∗(n)e = Pr
[{
(Mˆ0, Mˆ) 6= (M0,M)
}
∪
{
M˜0 6= M0
}]
(38)
and non-secrecy is measured by D(PMZn ||PMQnZ). A rate
pair (R0, R) is achievable if, for any ξ1, ξ2 > 0, there is a
sufficiently large n, an encoder and two decoders such that
P ∗(n)e ≤ ξ1 (39)
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) ≤ ξ2. (40)
The effective secrecy capacity region CBCC is the closure of
the set of achievable (R0, R). We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: CBCC is the same as the weak and strong
secrecy capacity region
CBCC =
⋃
(R0, R) :
0 ≤ R0 ≤ min {I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)}
0 ≤ R ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
 (41)
where the union is over all distributions QUVX satisfying the
Markov chain
U − V −X − Y Z. (42)
One may restrict the alphabet sizes to
|U| ≤ |X |+ 3; |V| ≤ |X |2 + 4|X |+ 3. (43)
Proof: The proof is omitted due to the similarity to the
proof of Theorem 1.
D. Choice of Security Measures
Effective secrecy includes both strong secrecy and stealth
communication. One may argue that using only I(M ;Zn)
or D(PZn ||Q
n
Z) would suffice to measure secrecy. However,
we consider two examples where secrecy is achieved but not
stealth, and where stealth is achieved but not secrecy.
Example 1: I(M ;Zn) → 0, D(PZn ||QnZ) = D > 0.
Suppose that Joey inadvertently uses Q˜X rather than QX for
codebook generation, where (22) is still satisfied. The new Q˜X
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could result in a different expected Q˜nZ 6= QnZ . Hence, as n
grows large we have
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) = I(M ;Z
n) +D(Q˜nZ ||Q
n
Z) (44)
where I(M ;Zn)→ 0 but we have
D(Q˜nZ ||Q
n
Z) = D, for some D > 0. (45)
Ross thus recognizes that Joey is transmitting useful informa-
tion even though he cannot decode.
Example 2: I(M ;Zn) = I > 0, D(PZn ||QnZ)→ 0.
Note that E[D(PZn ||QnZ)] → 0 as n → ∞ as long as (see
[7, Theorem 1])
R+R1 > I(X ;Z). (46)
If Joey is not careful and chooses R1 such that (22) is violated
and (46) is satisfied, then D(PZn ||QnZ) can be made small but
we have
I(M ;Zn) = I for some I > 0. (47)
Thus, although the communication makes D(PZn ||QnZ) small,
Ross can learn
I(M ;Zn) ≈ n[I(X ;Z)−R1] (48)
bits about M if he is willing to pay a price and always tries
to decode (see Sec. IV).
IV. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The reader may wonder how D(PZn ||QnZ) relates to stealth.
We consider a hypothesis testing framework and show that as
long as (46) is satisfied, the best Ross can do to detect Joey’s
action is to guess.
For every channel output zn, Ross considers two hypotheses
H0 = Q
n
Z (49)
H1 = PZn . (50)
If H0 is accepted, then Ross decides that Joey’s transmission is
not meaningful, whereas if H1 is accepted, then Ross decides
that Joey is sending useful messages. We define two kinds of
error probabilities
α = Pr{H1 is accepted |H0 is true} (51)
β = Pr{H0 is accepted |H1 is true}. (52)
The value α is referred to as the level of significance [14] and
corresponds to the probability of raising a false alarm, while
β corresponds the probability of mis-detection. In practice,
raising a false alarm can be expensive. Therefore, Ross would
like to minimize β for a given tolerance level of α. To this
end, Ross performs for every zn a ratio test
QnZ(z
n)
PZn(zn)
= r (53)
and makes a decision depending on a threshold F , F ≥ 0,
namely {
H0 is accepted if r > F
H1 is accepted if r ≤ F
. (54)
Define the set of zn for which H0 is accepted as
AnF =
{
zn :
QnZ(z
n)
PZn(zn)
> F
}
(55)
and (AnF )
c is the set of zn for which H1 is accepted (see
Fig. 3). Ross chooses the threshold F and we have
α = QnZ((A
n
F )
c
) = 1−QnZ (A
n
F )
β = PZn(A
n
F ). (56)
The ratio test in (53) is the Neyman-Pearson test which is
optimal [14, Theorem 3.2.1] in the sense that it minimizes β
for a given α. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: If D(PZn ||QnZ) ≤ ξ2, ξ2 > 0, then with the
Neyman-Pearson test we have
1− g(ξ2) ≤ α+ β ≤ 1 + g(ξ2) (57)
where
g(ξ2) =
√
ξ2 · 2 ln 2 (58)
which goes to 0 as ξ2 → 0.
Proof: Since D(PZn ||QnZ) ≤ ξ2, we have (see (60))
||PZn −Q
n
Z ||TV ≤
√
ξ2 · 2 ln 2 = g(ξ2) (59)
where
||PX −QX ||TV =
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| (60)
is the variational distance between PX and QX and where
the inequality follows by Pinsker’s inequality [15, Theorem
11.6.1]. We further have
||PZn −Q
n
Z ||TV
=
∑
zn∈An
F
|PZn(z
n)−QnZ(z
n)|
+
∑
zn∈(An
F
)c
|PZn(z
n)−QnZ(z
n)|
≥
∑
zn∈An
F
|PZn(z
n)−QnZ(z
n)|
(a)
≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
zn∈An
F
[PZn(z
n)−QnZ(z
n)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= |PZn(A
n
F )−Q
n
Z(A
n
F )|
= |β − (1− α)| (61)
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where (a) follows by the triangle inequality. Combining (59)
and (61), we have the bounds (57).
Fig. 4 illustrates the optimal tradeoff between α and β for
stealth communication, i.e., when (46) is satisfied. As n→∞
and ξ2 → 0, we have
D(PZn ||Q
n
Z)→ 0 (62)
(α+ β)→ 1. (63)
If Ross allows no false alarm (α = 0), then he always ends up
with mis-detection (β = 1). If Ross tolerates no mis-detection
(β = 0), he pays a high price (α = 1). Further, for any given
α, the optimal mis-detection probability is
βopt = 1− α. (64)
But Ross does not need to see Zn or perform an optimal test
to achieve βopt. He may randomly choose some A′ such that
QnZ((A
′)c) = α (65)
and achieves β′opt = 1− α. The best strategy is thus to guess.
On the other hand, if
lim
n→∞
D(PZn ||Q
n
Z) > 0 (66)
then Ross detects Joey’s action and we can have
α+ β = 0. (67)
We thus operate in one of two regimes in Fig. 4, either near
(α, β) = (0, 0) or near the line α+ β = 1.
V. DISCUSSION
Our resolvability proof differs from that in [6] in that we
rely on unnormalized informational divergence [7] instead
of variational distance [5]. Our proof is simpler and the
result is stronger than that in [6] when restricting attention to
product distributions and memoryless channels because a small
D(PMZn ||PMQ
n
Z) implies small I(M ;Zn) and D(PZn ||QnZ)
while a small ||PXn−QnX ||TV implies only a small I(M ;Zn)
[4, Lemma 1].
Hayashi studied strong secrecy for wire-tap channels using
resolvability based on unnormalized divergence and he derived
bounds for nonasymptotic cases [11, Theorem 3]. We remark
that Theorem 1 can be derived by extending [11, Lemma 2] to
asymptotic cases. However, Hayashi did not consider stealth
but focused on strong secrecy, although he too noticed a formal
connection to (7) [11, p. 1568].
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